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"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and
great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass
by because they did not deal with the Constitution or a telephone company, yet
which have in them the germ of some wider theory, and therefore of some profound interstitialchange in the very tissue of the law."---OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS

(1920) 269.

Comments
TO AcT-DICK v. PAGE'
As a general rule the authority of an agent, not coupled with an interest,2
is instantly terminated by the death of the principal, and any attempted execution
of the authority after that event is not binding upon the heirs or representatives of
DEATH OF PRINCIPAL AS TERMINATING AGENT'S POWER

1. 17 Mo. 234 (1852).
2. It is not within the scope of this comment to consider powers coupled
with an interest.

(50)
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947

1

19471

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1947], Art. 9
COMMIAENTS

the deceased principal. This was said to be the Common Law rule,3 but while the
Civil Law adopted the same rule, it made an exception, namely, where agent performed some act, within the scope of his authority, in good faith and without
knowledge of principal's death, the authority would not be terminated.4 Of this
Civil Law exception, Chancellor Kent said, ". . . this equitable principle does not
prevail in the English law . . ." and as a consequence the strict Common Law
rule was adopted by a majority of the states.
Obviously the Common Law position is a harsh one5 and to relieve this harshness some states have enacted statutes 6 requiring that a third party or agent have
knowledge of principal's death before the agency power is terminated. But by
and large the legislatures have left the problem with the courts, some of which
have severely criticized Kent's conception of the Common Law rule. By two
exhaustive opinions in Ish. v. Crane,- Judge Sutliffe analyzed all the cases cited
by Kent and decided that in regard to the so-called Civil Law exception, the English
authorities do not deny its existence, but in fact recognize it to a limited extent.8
He also pointed out that in the usual case where principal revokes agent's authori3. 1MEcHni, AGENCY (2d ed., 1914) §§ 652,664; STORY, AGENCY (9th ed.
1882) § § 488, 495; 2 Kent, Commentaries (13th ed., 1884) § 646; 2 C. J. § § 179,
181; 2 C. J. S. §§ 85, 87 (a, 1. b, c,). The classic reason for the rule is that since
P cannot act for himself after death, A cannot act for him. MncrnM, op cit supra at
§ 651.
4. MECHEM op. cit. supra note 3 at § 651; STORY opcit supra note 3 at
§ 488.
5. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Wilson, 139 N. Y. 284, 34 N. E. 784
(1893) (P died and T continued to pay A the rents, neither T nor A knowing of
P's death; held, P's representative could recover from T the rents paid to A
after death ofP); Clayton v. Merrett, 52 Miss. 353 (1876) (Pursuant to P's
authority, A sued T and recovered, but P had died before recovery without A or
T knowing of it; held, ''s payment to A did not satisfy the debt); Seavey, in
,1934) 11 PROc., A. L. I. 86, says that, "The agent is in a dilemma-to act or
not to act. If h'e acts and his principal is dead, he is liable (on his implied warranty of authority). If he does not act and his principal lives, he is liable."
Note (1930) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 265.
6. MD. ANN. CODE (Flack, 1939) art, 10, § 41; PA. STAT. (Purdon, Compact
ed., 1936) tit. 21, § 304; S. C. CODE OF LAWs (1942) § 7018. The language of
other codes would seem to lend itself to this interpretation: CAL CIv. CODE (Deering, 1941) § 2356; MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. (1935) § 7975; N. D. Re,. Code
(1943) § 3-0111; S. D. CODE (1939) § 3.1109.
7. 8 Ohio St. Rep. 521 (1858), reheard 13 Ohio St. Rep. 574 (1862). These
two cases present a thorough study of the problem. Judge Sutliffe champions
the Civil Law exception, but he has scrutinized all the authorities.
8. 13 Ohio St. Rep. 574, 599 (1862). Note must be taken of the authority
stating that it has not been accepted by the Common Law. Supra note 3. Barristers arguing these cases were aware of the Civil Law of Scotland (Campbell
v. Anderson, IV Bligh N. S. 513 (1829)) as well as STORY's WORK ON AGENCY (cited
by counsel in Smout v. Illbery, 10, 10 M. & W. 1, 5 (1843)). It is hard to believe that
Common Law adopted the Civil Law exception, even to a "limited extent" and
these cases involving notice were not settled on that point. Infra, note 14. The
best that can be said for Judge Sutliffe's thesis is that the question of notice
does not appear to have been carefully argued. Everyone seemed to take it
for granted that the Common Law made no exception on that ground.
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ty, it is not binding until principal notifies agent. Until he is so notified, A can
continue to act under the authority. Then why, he asks, should there be a contrary rule where authority is terminated by operation of liw, by the death of
principal?0
Seavey has also criticized the Common Law rule, but he does not attempt
to reconcile the two rules as Sutliffe and Story did. He says that the Common
Law was immersed in its theory of the identity of principal and agent, and therefore could not consider knowledge as a requisite of terminating A's power.10
The rule that P's death terminates A's power seems to originate in Littleton"
in a case where the feoffer's death terminated the power he gave his attorney to
deliver seisin to T. The assigned reason is that if the feoffor dies the land descends
to his heirs, so that there is nothing for the attorney to deliver should he attempt
to exercise his power. About the same time the Common Law maxim qui facit per
alium facit per se was making its presence felt and the logicians of the Common
Law conceived that by applying this maxim when principal had died, agent could
not act because principal could not. Littleton's help was not necessary for this
exercise in logic, but his rule added weighty authority. Thus this rule, which
may have had its origin in the law of descent of property, by the 18th century
applied to fields other than realty, but in none of the English cases is the question of
notice raised.12 However, in the 19th century one case seems to hold squarely
that the power is terminated by principal's death even though agent had no notice
thereof and acted in good faith,'8 another seems to question this rule,' 4 and by
9. Id at 613. But see MECHEM, op. cit. supra note at § § 651, 720, 721.
10. Seavey, The Rationale of Agency (1920), 29 YALE L. J. 859, 893; Seavey,
Termination by Death of Proprietary Powers of Attorney (1922), 31 YALE L. J.
283; Seavey, Problems in Restatement of the Law of Agency (1930), 16 A. B. A. J.
117, 120; SEAVEY (1934) 11 PRoc. A. L. I. 85-94. See HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAWv
(1st ed., 1881) p. 232; HOLMES, Agency (1891), 4 HARv. L. REv. 345, cont'd' HARv.

L. Rpv. 1.
11. Co. Lnrr. § § 66, 52. Prior to the 13th century, assignment of contract
rights was effected by means of attorney. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed., 1936)
§ 408. These powers were terminable by operation of law, as by death, for instance.
Id at § 409. However, there seemed to be no authority as to the effect of death
on the power prior to Littleton.
12. (Assignment of contract cases. Mitchell v. Eades, Pre. Ch. 125 (1700),
power to collect seaman's wages; Shipman v. Thompson, Willes 103 (1738), power to collect rents. See Seavey, "Termination by Death of Proprietary Powers of

Attorney, (1922), 31 YALE L. J. 283.
13. Blades v. Free, 9 B. & C. (1829). But see Ish v. Crane, 8 Ohio St. Rep.
521,;521 (1858), which says that in the Blades case the question of notice, as a
condition to P's death terminating A's authority, was not argued by counsel;
Therefore the case cannot in truth be said to hold that notice is immaterial.
14.

Smout v. Ilbery, 10 M. & W. 1 (1843)

(T sued A on a contract A ex-

ecuted for P after P's death, of which neither A nor T had knowledge; held, A
cannot be held personally liable on a contract purporting to bind P, there is no
warranty by A that her husband would remain alive.) See Tate v. Hilbert, 2
Ves. Jr. 111 (1793) (Lord Loughborough, by dictum, said that if T the payee of
the check, had presented the check to A, the bank. for payment after P, the
maker, had died, before A or T knew of the death, and it had been paid, no court
in the world would take the payment away from T.
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dictum a third approves the Civil Law exception. :15 These English cases at least
contain caveats to warn against the strict rule, but only in the Civil Law countries and seven states' 6 are there square holdings making exceptions to it.
Judge Story was probably responsible for American courts adopting the Civil
Law exception. He agreed that the Common Law did not seem to make any
exceptions, but impressed by the hardship arising from application of the strict
rule to cases where agent continued to act in ignorance of principal's death, he
concluded that there was actually no difference in principle between the two rules on
the question of notice.'1 He suggested that the Civil Law exception applied only
to the case where A acted in his own name and that in the Civil Law countries it
was the custom for A to act in his own name; that, therefore, whenever A's act
must be done in P's name, under the Civil Law P's death prior to such act would
terminate A's, authority, irrespective of notice. The next step in his argument
is that in the Common Law countries it is customary for A to act in P's name,
hence the Common Law is in line with the Civil Law when it rules that death of
P terminates A's authority without notice thereof. Since, then, Common Law agents
like the factor, supercargo and ship's master are authorized to act in their own
names, death of P does not terminate their authority without notice. Assuming
the validity of his position with respect to the difference in modes of executing A's
authority, his case falls apart on the last point. He admits that in the case of the
factor, supercargo and master, they ". . . seem in truth to be disposed of by the
single consideration, that they either are, in fact, cases of powers coupled with an
interest, or are governed by like analogy."' This obvious fault in his logic was not
5
overlooked by the courts' but still many cases adopted the Story rationale: 0
15. McDonnell v. McDonnell, Buck 399 (1819) (This is a bankruptcy case,
but the court bases its decision on a case where a power of attorney, sent to India,
was exercised by A after death of P in England, but without notice of P's death;
held, by Lord Kenyon that A validly exercised the power). However, this case
cannot be found, nor did the McDonnell court give a citation to it.
16 Lewis v. Kerr and Craig, 17 Iowa 73 (1864); supra note 1; Deweese v.
Muff, 57 Nebr. 17 (1898); Ish v. Crane, 8 Ohio St. Rep. 520 (1858); Catlin v. Read,
141 Okla. 14, 283 Pac. 549 (1929); Cassiday v. McKenzie, 4 Watts & S. (Penn.) 282
39 Am. Dec. 76 (1842; and Lenz v. Brown, 41 Wisc. 172 (1876).
An effort was made to incorporate the Civil Law exception into the
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY, (1934 11 PROC. A. L. I. 87-94; Seavey,
Problem in Restatement of the Law of Agency (1930), 16 A. B. A. J. 117, 120.
But see (1927) 5 PRoc. A. L. I. As finally adopted a mere caveat was added
leaving a "loophole" for courts wishing to follow the Civil Law exception. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY

(1933) § 120..

17. STORY, AGENCY (9th ed., 1882) § 495: "The difference on this subject
between our law (Common Law) and the latter (Civil Law) seems to rest, not so
.much upon a difference of principles, as upon the difference in the modes of executing the authority."
18. Id at § 496: ". . . cases must constantly have arisen . . . when the death
of the principal must have been known." This was Judge Story's case authority for
his theory.
19. Ish v. Crane, 8 Ohio St. Rep. 521, 536 (1858); Clayton v. Merrett, 52
.iiss. 353. 359 (1876).
20. Supra note 16. This is not the pure Civil Law exception which makes
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When the act is one that must be performed in principal's name, his death' terminates A's power to perform the act, following the strict Common Law rule; but
if it is an act that, while done for P, need not be done expressly in his name,
death of P does not terminate A's authority so to act until notice is given, following the Civil Law exception.21

The Missouri Supreme Court in an early case, Dick v. Page,22 was decidedly
influenced by Judge Story. There the action was in the nature of assumpsit for
money had and received by the deceased principal's executor against T, the third
third party. In the presence of T, principal had authorized A to borrow from T
and to transfer such securities to T as were necessary to secure the debt. After
his death A borrowed from T, the money being used in P's business, and secured
the debt by transferring to 7' several notes payable to P. Some time after this
transaction the parties first learned of P'. death. All but one of the notes werepaid to T, and it was for these sums that P's executor sued T. The issue was
whether P's death terminated A's authority to borrow money and secure this debt
for P. It was held that it did not; that, therefore, there could be no recovery.
The opinion is brief. It cited Kent's propositon about the strict Common Lar
rule, then stated that, "This principle, which' is sustained by American and English authorities, is to be applied to those cases in which a right is claimed through
an act done by an Agent in the name of his Principal (italics mine) who was dead
at the time the act was done." After citing a few English cases allegedly supporting that proposition, the court mentioned Russell and Chitty to emphasize that
where A acted pursuant to his authority from P without notice of P's death, lie
acted with color of authority good as against strangers. Then the court recited
no distinction between acts done in P's name and those done in A's name, so far
as the notice requirement is concerned. Supra note 4. It is believed that Cassiday
v. McKenzie, 4 Watts & S. 282 (1842 is the only American case which purports to, and actually does, adopt the pure Civil Law exception, as distinguished
from Story's attempted rationalization of the Civil and Common Law rules. Accord:
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1936) § 120; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, Commentary (Tent.
Draft. no. 2, 1927) § 200. Contra: Seavey (1934)

11 PROC. A. L. I. 88 (William

Draper Lewis reports that Mechem stated positively that there were no cases against
"the old rule," presumably meaning the strict Common Law rule); Note (1923) 9
VA. L. REv. 644. See MECHEM op. cit. supra note 3 §§ 651, 664.
21. There appears to be some ground for such distinction where A's authority is to execute a deed in P's name and convey land to 7. Then when P dies,
title to the land vests at once in P's heirs and a conveyance from A to T in T's
name conveys nothing. But note that the reason is not any magic in names, but
rather that the property has descended to P's heirs, and any conveyance by A
would be a nullity. Infra. note 11. Aside from this one situation which does
not involve notice at all, it is submitted that Story's attempted rationalization is
meaningless. Story admits himself out of court when he says that all powers
should be exercised in P's name, thus eliminating any opportunity to utilize his

attempted rationalization.

STORY, AGENCY

(9th ed., 1882) § 147.

But see Seavey, The Rationale of Agency (1920), 29 YALE L. J. 859, 893:
"Story makes the distinction between the acts which must be done in the name of
the principal and those which may be done in the name of the agent, and if we
treat form alone, this may be of some importance."
22. Supra note 1.
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the Story exception to the Common Law rule: The holding of the case is in the
final paragraph: A could impart an equitable interest in the notes without nsiNg the
name of P; in maintaining a defense, T insists on no acts of A in the name of P; A
may be regarded as P's factor with authority to pass the notes by delivery, so as
to warrant T receiving the money due on them; and finally,, "To hold that this
transaction is void would shock the sense of justice of every man, and we cannot be persuaded that a principle which would produce such a result should be applied to the facts which exist in this case."
Unfortunately no Missouri case has been found which mentions the Dick case
(although Carrigerv. Whittington; 3 seems to follow it squarely), so its meaning
is not clear. Courts from other jurisdictions differ as to its holding;2 4 nor is there
agreement among the writers. 25 The decision seems to adopt the Story view of
the Civil Law exception.28 Kent and Story were the acknowledged authorities of
that time. Their pronouncements were accepted as authoritative.27 Thus the Missouri Court gave lip-service to Chancellor Kent's version of the Common Law
rule, but it did not subscribe to that as has been alleged. On the contrary, the
court immediately limited the application of the principle to acts which agent must
do in principal's name.2 8 Next it referred to Russell and Chitty to lend some sup23.. 26 Mo. 311 (1858) (In a suit by P's administrator against A's administrator to recover money collected pursuant to a contract he executed for P
after P's death, A being ignorant of the death, it was held that P's administrator
could recover on equitable grounds.) Obviously the broad holding of the Dick
case is not questioned here since P's administrator ' approves A's authority to bind
the estate after P's death. Indeed, decided six years after the Dick case and
with one judge sitting on the bench during both cases, this case seems to presuppose acceptance of the Civil Law exception.
24. Dick v. Page was said to hold: in Clayton v. Merrett, 52 Miss. 353
(1876), Principal's estate would be estopped to deny agent's power to bind; in
Cleveland v. Williams, 29 Tex. 204 (1867), Pure Civil Law rule; in Ish v. Crane,
8 Ohio St. Rep. 520 (1858); and Deweese v. Muff, 57 Nebr. 17 (1898), the Story
rationalization of the Civil and Common Law rules; this latter view is generally
accepted.
Oddly enough, two landmark cases following the Civil Law exception in one
form or another do not even mention the Dick case: Lewis v. Kerr and Craig, 17
Iowa 73 (1864) and Lenz v. Brown, 41 Wisc. 172 (1876).
25. STORY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 498 (the Story rationalization of the Civil
and Common Law rules); MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 3, § 664 (Where A deposited collaterals as security for advance made after P's death, all parties being ignorant of it, the deposit was valid as aginst the executor of P). Cf. Draper's
statement in n. 20 supra; Seavey. "Termination by Death of the Proprietary Powers of Attorney (1922), 31 YALE L. J. 283, 297 n. 70 ("The Missouri rule is explicitl limited to real property"): Note (1923) 9 Va. L. Rev. 644, 648 (The
Common Law Rule).
26. Accord: RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, Commentary (Tent. Draft no. 2, 1927)
§ 200, p 10.
27. Of all pertinent cases read, only one questioned Kent's statement that
mental inconsistencies between Kent and Story. Ish v. Crane, 13 Ohio St. Rep.
the strict Common Law rule was the rule in the states and pointed out the funda574, 611 (1862).
28. Supra note 1. There is nothing in Kent to justify such limitation. It
is simply the Story rationalization applied to Kent.
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port to the Story proposition, and held that here A could act in his own name, so
that death of P did not terminate his authority. It even used Story's example of
the factor to prove the point. But observe that the word "notice" is not mentioned in that paragragh. The court apparently based its opinion on A's authority
2
to execute the power in his own name. 0
Two other cases adopting the Story view are Ish v. Crane and Deweese v.
Muff. 30

Their facts and issues are similar to those of the Dick case. Both courts

commingle with the Story rationalization the rule that where principal by act
revokes agent's authority but does not notify agent of such revocation, A may continue to act for P within the scope of his apparent authority.,- The reason given
for following this view is that public policy and the requirements of business
and commerce demand that A have power to bind P until he is notified that his
authority is terminated.
These three cases briefly illustrate the reasons given to justify support of the
Civil Law exception in the teeth of the nearly overwhelming authority of the
majority rule. The real question they raise is, should the agent be empowered to
bind the deceased principal's estate?3 2 Seavey proposes a possible answer."3 He
suggests that P's estate be obligated to the extent of A's right of exoneration. This
rights exists where A is about to be injured, through no fault of his own, because
he obeyed P's orders. Admitting that the agent's power terminated when principal died, there is no reason why the right of exoneration should cease. Therefore,
if A, acting innocently, has subjected himself to claims by a third party, the prin4
cipal's estate should exonerate him. Thus the third party could reach the estate.A
However, the Common Law, the Civil Law and Judge Story's rationalization have
provided the three principal answers to the question.
JERRED BLANCHARD

29. It should be noted that this opinion seems to presuppose Story's theory
which applies only to cases where agent acted in good faith, without notice of
P's death. STORY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 492.
30. Supra note 24.
31. Id. at 20; 8 Ohio St. Rep. 521, 527-536; Supra note 9.
32. Seavey, Problems in Restatement of the Law of Agency (1930), 16
A. B. A. J. 117, 120. In France this is carried one step further. Where the agency
relationship involved commerce it continued after P's death until revoked by P's
heir or other successor. 1 POTHIER

ON

OBLIGATIONS (3rd Am. ed., 1853) p. 365.

33. A means of relieving A of liability is suggested by Carriger v. Whittington, 26 Mo. 311 (1858) and Seavey, Termination by Death of Proprietary Powers of Attorney (1922), 31 YALE L. J. 283, 291. This rule presupposes acceptance
of the strict Common Law view, but where A acts pursuant to his supposed
authority, in good faith, and ignorant of P's death, equity should enter to hold
him harmless in a suit against him, as by T, for instance, on A's warranty of authority. This would seem an appropriate situation in which to exercise equity's power to
alleviate hardship. Supra notes 5 and' 14.
34. Seavey, The Rationale of Agency (1920), 29 YALE L. J. 859, 894. The
.author comments that a simpler way to achieve the result would be to eliminate the
equitable stips and treat the power as continuing until the agent has been notified
(.the Civil Law exception). Such is now the rule in England under the CON"'VEYANCING AND LAW OF PROPERTY ACT, 44-45 Vict. p. 110 (1881).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947

7

